WHAT THE RESEARCH SHOWS
The following is a
summary of information from studies, reports and articles on the impact
of casino gambling on communities. All the source material is available
at our storefront at 91 Partition Street, Saugerties, N.Y. 12477 (845-
246-8996).
Three major
conclusions can be drawn from the research:
1.
Any economic gains will be outweighed by the
costs arising from the crime and social problems that follow
the casino and from economic losses to established local businesses.[1]
2.
There are risks to communities in which land is
owned and developed by American Indian tribes because the tribes are
sovereign nations; environmental, land use and tax laws that
apply to everyone else do not apply them. It is also legally risky for
local entities contracting with American Indian tribes because the law
about off-reservation casinos is unsettled. In addition to being
sovereign nations, the tribes are also wards of the federal government,
and there is no developed federal law about what terms are
enforceable in a contract between a local entity like a town or a county
and a sovereign Indian nation under the control and protection of the
federal government.[2]
3.
Saugerties would
be overwhelmed by the
size of the casino complex and the tens of thousands of
employees and customers it would bring. It would overwhelm any Hudson
Valley municipality. Further, the millions (if not billions) of dollars
which leave the pockets of casino guests will give the developer and the
tribe the ability to exert influence amounting to control over both
Saugerties and Ulster County.[3]
Saugerties will remain a village and town in name only.
DISCUSSION
1. LOW BENEFITS,
HIGH COSTS
Independent studies
have concluded that the overall economic cost of casinos is greater
than the economic benefit derived from them. Likewise, the social
cost, which is crime and pathological gambling, is far greater than the
entertainment value of casinos, which is their only social benefit.[4]
JOBS:
The casino will produce a small number of managerial level jobs. Some of
these may go to residents of Saugerties or neighboring communities.
Because they are probably already employed, that will force local
employers to find new help.[5]
Most jobs, however,
will be low wage.
There will be thousands of these. They will probably offer health
benefits, which will make the jobs attractive (although there are NO
unionized Indian Casino workers at present). However, the economic
disadvantage to the local business community will be that low- and
midrange-wage workers whose present employers cannot afford health
benefits will be drawn away from small businesses in Saugerties and
neighboring communities.[6]
Further, most of
the thousands of low-wage workers will come from far away, including
foreign countries. They will require thousands of low-cost rental
units and will send thousands of additional children to local schools.
Many of these children will need special services, such as English as a
second language. In Norwich, Connecticut, which receives the majority of
the children of workers at Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun, some 32
different languages are spoken by children of casino workers.[7]
COMPETITIVE
DISADVANTAGE FOR LOCAL BUSINESS:
The casino complex includes a huge shopping mall. At Foxwoods’ mall
(smaller than the one projected for Saugerties) there are many
restaurants (gourmet to fast food) and clothing stores. It also sells
liquor, jewelry, tobacco, newspapers, magazines, candy, snacks,
“sundries”, flowers and gasoline. In addition, gamblers get “wampum
credits” good in the “trading post” for audio/visual, home, kitchen,
office, outdoors, seasonal, sports equipment and tools—100 brands, from
Apple to Yamaha.[8]
They can underprice local businesses offering the same goods and
services.[9]
Further, they discourage location here of new businesses which
might offer these same goods and services. And they discourage
corporations looking for new locations or headquarters.[10]
New businesses which do arrive tend to be such enterprises as pawn
shops and donut shops.[11]
The casino doesn’t buy from local suppliers, but from huge wholesalers.[12]
REAL ESTATE VALUES:
A casino decreases the value of surrounding real estate.[13]
INFRASTRUCTURE
COSTS:
A casino would drain the financial resources of Saugerties and
surrounding communities forced to increase police, emergency and fire
departments.[14]
SOCIAL DECAY:
It would produce enormous profits for itself and these would give it
enormous influence over politicians, local, state and federal.[15]
CRIME:
Most studies NOT funded by the gambling industry have documented
sharp increases in crime after a casino is sited in a community. The
crime spreads outward and increases over the years. Crime represents an
economic as well as a social problem.[16]
Even studies funded by the gambling industry backhandedly admit to
increased crime by noting the community would need a stronger police
presence.[17]
A substantial
portion of the crime is committed by problem and pathological gamblers
who are drawn to the area, or by local people who become, over time,
problem and pathological gamblers. Though relatively few in numbers,
these people account for a large proportion both of gambling revenues
(39%) and of crime. The necessity of providing treatment for
pathological gamblers is another economic cost of casinos.[18]
Other tourist
attractions do not generate crime.[19]
OTHER SOCIAL ILLS:
Pathological gambling dramatically increases rates of domestic
violence, divorce, suicide and bankruptcy. Liquor flow in casinos
dramatically increases the amount of drunk driving leading to
traffic accidents.[20]
2. THE HIGH RISKS
OF CONTRACTING WITH A SOVEREIGN NATION
Indian Tribes are
both sovereign nations and wards of the federal government. As
sovereign nations, they are immune from many of the federal laws
which govern all other citizens of the United States, and they are
immune from all state and local law, unless the federal government
otherwise legislates. As wards, they are under the direct oversight of
the federal government, which is their guardian.[21]
At the present moment there are disputes all around the country about
the legal consequences of this dual status for the relationship between
states and tribes with regard to tribal commercial enterprises in
general, and casinos in particular.[22]
Therefore,
contracting with a sovereign Indian nation is not like contracting with
any other person or business. Only the federal congress has power to
govern the American Indian Nations. Even federal legislation must be
specifically directed to Indian Nations or must specifically indicate
that it is meant to cover them, or it may not.[23]
State laws are inapplicable unless the federal government makes specific
legislative provisions that particular state laws should apply.[24]
Local law, such as property taxes and zoning regulations, do not apply
at all.
The Indian Gambling
Regulatory Act [IGRA], passed in 1988 for the purpose of creating
economic opportunity for impoverished Indians living on reservations,
requires states that allow casino gambling to negotiate compacts (i.e.
treaties) with tribes to allow for Indian casinos. If a particular tribe
wants a casino in a state which has casino gambling already, the state
must enter a treaty to allow the tribe a casino. The terms of the
compacts are controlled by the federal government, but at the present it
is uncertain, even at the state level, what may be allowable in such a
contract.
[25]
There is no
explicit authority under the IGRA for any local entity-- county or
municipality --to enter a contract with a sovereign Indian Nation. It is
therefore even more uncertain than on the state level what contract
terms may be relied on by a municipality or county.[26]
When Indian nations
buy non-reservation lands (like Winston Farm), they do so on the same
terms as any other person. They are subject to all local laws pertaining
to land, such as property taxes. But federal law authorizes the Indian
nations to apply to the Bureau of Indian Affairs [BIA] to take that land
and put it into “trust”,[27]
at which point it becomes “Indian lands”,[28]
and all such local law ceases to apply. At the present moment, all
around the country, there are costly legal battles over whether or not
particular pieces of land are or are not Indian lands, taxable or not
taxable. The town of Verona, N.Y., for example, has spent
approximately $30,000 so far trying to collect property taxes assessed
on off-reservation lands owned by the Oneida tribe, which contends that
the land should be regarded as untaxable.[29]
There is also at
this moment a federal investigation of the process by which the BIA
takes land into trust, and there are lawsuits about that process.[30]
The only thing clear in this area of law is that it is unsettled. If
Saugerties were to enter a contract with the Seneca-Cayuga nation it
would be buying an almost inevitable law suit with an adversary who has
substantially more money.
Further, once the
Seneca-Cayuga have taken Winston Farm into trust, they may buy and
apply to take into trust any land bordering on it. If the bordering
land is taken into trust, it too becomes Indian land. The towns of
Ledyard, Preston and North Stonington Connecticut have spent
approximately $1.2 million over twelve years trying to stop the
Mashantucket-Pequot tribe (owners of Foxwoods) from expanding their
sovereign holdings from 2,000 to more than 9,000 acres. If the tribe had
taken into trust all the lands specified in the lawsuit they would be
sovereign now over 12 percent of Ledyard, 5 percent of Preston and 14
percent of North Stonington.[31]
There is a great
deal of open land contiguous to Winston Farm. To allow the
Seneca-Cayuga to buy Winston Farm and take it into trust would be an
invitation for the tribe to take all the rest of that land as well,
removing it from tax rolls and local governance.
3. THE END OF
SAUGERTIES AS WE KNOW IT
ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES:
Sovereign tribal lands are not subject to federal, state or local laws
protecting the environment, nor are they subject to local zoning laws.[32]
Winston Farm sits
on top of a large and important aquifer.[33]
In addition to the enormous amount of water the casino would use,[34]
the heavy development of the land threatens the quality of the water
remaining for all other users.
The comprehensive water protection plan adopted by the Saugerties
Conservation Advisory Committee has recommended that no more than 10% of
that land be developed, that development not include more than a minimum
of earthmoving, filling and excavating, that natural vegetation be
preserved and protected whenever possible and that among uses forbidden
on the site should be golf courses, because they rely on toxic chemicals
for the upkeep of greens.[35]
Three golf courses as well as many huge buildings and parking areas are
proposed by the casino developers.
The casino would
generate enormous amounts of traffic. The developers estimate 19,000
cars a day. The experience of the people in the communities
surrounding Foxwoods is that the burden is 50,000 cars a day. In
addition to an increase in traffic accidents, these cars release fumes
into the air which would be trapped in place by the mountains.[36]
The casino would
operate twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, illuminating the
night, which disorients migratory birds and ruins the nights for
those who love the sky.
THE CHARACTER OF
THE COMMUNITY:
The mega-casino complex would be the first thing people see when they
come to Saugerties. Saugerties would cease to be known for its scenic
beauty-- the beauty of the village itself and the surrounding land. It
would cease to be known for its riverfront, restaurants, inns and
antique shops, for its artists and musicians, its festivals, its horse
shows, or anything else of which we are proud. It would be dominated
by the casino and known only as a place on the map where the casino is
located. The money in the hands of the casino owners would give them
enormous influence over local politicians,[37]
which could assure their continued untrammeled growth. Saugerties would
effectively cease to be an independent municipality.
[1]
Testimony of Professor John Warren Kindt, Univ. Ill. , Before the
U.S. House of Representatives Commission on Resources, 109th Cong.,
1st sess., April 27, 2005 [cited hereafter as Kindt
Testimony]; Grinols and Mustard (professors of economics univ. of
Ill. and univ. of Ga, respectively), Business Profitability
versus Social Profitability: Evaluating Industries with
Externalities, The Case of Casinos, [cited hereafter as G&M,
Business Profitability] Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 143-162 (2001)
p. 144
[2]
With regard to federal control over all aspects of Indian Affairs,
see: U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 3; Johnson v. McIntosh,
21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. 29, sec. 2701 et. seq.
[hereafter IGRA] With regard to the uncertainties of the present
state of the law, see material at footnotes 21 – 31.
[3]
See material at footnote 1. See also Senator Frank Padavan, “All
Gambling All the Time”, a legislative report for New York State,
2004,[hereafter Padavan Report] p. 76; Andrea Barrist Stern, “New
Sheriff in Town”, Saugerties Times, Oct. 6, quoting a telephone
interview with Professor John Warren Kindt; Jeff Benedict, “A Raw
Deal: Measuring the Toll of Connecticut’s Casinos, published by the
Connecticut Alliance Against Casino Expansion, (courant.com) May
1, 2005; Jeff Benedict, “A Losing Hand”, published by the
Connecticut Alliance, 2005; Richard M. Aborn, “Gambling: Who’s
Really at Risk”, throughout.
[4]
See material at footnote 1. See also Senator Frank Padavan, “All
Gambling All the Time”, a legislative report for New York State,
2004,[hereafter Padavan Report] p. 76; Andrea Barrist Stern, “New
Sheriff in Town”, Saugerties Times, Oct. 6, quoting a telephone
interview with Professor John Warren Kindt; Jeff Benedict, “A Raw
Deal: Measuring the Toll of Connecticut’s Casinos, published by the
Connecticut Alliance Against Casino Expansion, (courant.com) May
1, 2005; Jeff Benedict, “A Losing Hand”, published by the
Connecticut Alliance, 2005; Richard M. Aborn, “Gambling: Who’s
Really at Risk”, throughout.
[5]
G&M, Business Profitability, above, p. 147-149; Wesley
Johnson, Mac Turner and Sharon Wadecki, officials from the towns
surrounding Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun Casinos, testimony at a public
meeting in Saugerties, Sept. 29, 2005 [hereafter Foxwoods
Testimony].
[6]
See Foxwoods Testimony; Jeff Benedict, “A Losing Hand” ; Andrea
Barrist Stern, “New Sheriff in Town”, quoting legal advice to the
effect that labor laws do not apply in native American owned
casinos. See also Tribal Nation, available at Tribalnation.com,
explaining that the NLRB ruled in late September of this year that
employees of Indian owned casinos are allowed to join unions and
seek federal job protection for the first time. At this moment,
instead of offering a living wage, Foxwoods casino has “the silver
lining” fund, which allows casino employees to help other employees
buy food, clothes and holiday gifts.
[7]
See Foxwoods testimony, above; Jeff Benedict, “A Losing Hand”,
above; Planning for the Future: Analyzing the Potential Economic
Impacts of Class III Casino Hotels on Sullivan County, N.Y.,
prepared for the Sullivan County Legislature by Spectrum Gaming
Group, L.L.C., [hereafter Planning for the Future]p. 139,
concluding that the County would have to be prepared to attract
commercial development other than casinos to offset the costs of an
“influx of population…prompting increasing demands for everything
from social services to schools….”
[8]
Kindt Testimony, above, p. 3; G&M, Business Profitability,
above, p. 146-147, 148; NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION,
FINAL REPORT to Congress (1999)[hereafter NIGSC] p. 7-5, 7-17
and -18; Steve Kemper, “This Land is Whose Land?”, Yankee magazine,
p. 121, 1998 [hereafter Yankee magazine] ; Foxwood Testimony,
above; Joel Rose, “Casinos in Erie County”, a talk at the Nov. 21,
2003 meeting of the Buffalo/Niagra League of Women Voters.
[9]
Kindt Testimony, above, p. 3; G&M, Business Profitability,
above, p. 146-147, 148; NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION,
FINAL REPORT to Congress (1999)[hereafter NIGSC] p. 7-5, 7-17
and -18; Steve Kemper, “This Land is Whose Land?”, Yankee magazine,
p. 121, 1998 [hereafter Yankee magazine] ; Foxwood Testimony,
above; Joel Rose, “Casinos in Erie County”, a talk at the Nov. 21,
2003 meeting of the Buffalo/Niagra League of Women Voters.
[10]
Kindt Testimony, above, p. 3; Foxwoods testimony, above; Yankee
magazine, above
[11]
G&M, Crime, p. 9; NIGSC, 7-5; Foxwoods Testimony.
[14]
EFFECTS OF CASINO GAMBLING ON CRIME AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN NEW
CASINO JURISDICTIONS, FINAL REPORT to the US Dept. of Justice, p.
159 [hereafter Dept. of Justice Report], noting that communities
needed to be able to meet the “added requirements imposed by a
casino’s presence [including] the planning of law enforcement
officials to prepare for potential problems….”; G&M, Crime,
p. 1, 4, 149; G&M, Business Profitability, p. 149-155; Aborn
Report, throughout.
[15]
. The influence is manifest in the dependence of local officials,
in enormous campaign contributions to State and Federal officials,
and in bribe-taking and other forms of corruption. See e.g. NIGSC,
p. 7-18; Thomas A. Barrett, Sr., economist, Community Affairs, Fed.
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Casino Gambling in America and its
Economic Impacts. 2003, p. 25; John Warren Kindt, Follow the
Money: Gambling, Ethics, and Subpoenas, 556 Annals of the Am.
Academy of Political & Soc. Sci., 85-97 (1998); Benedict, Without
Reservation, p.273, 325; G&M, Crime, p. 1; Kindt
Testimony, p. 5; Aborn report, p. 18-19; Joe Siccardi, Article
including information about undue political influence,
published in Revielle Between the Lakes,
Oct. 20, 2005; Andrea Barrist Stern, “The Secret of Success,”
Saugerties Times, Ulster Publishing Co., Inc., Vol. 10, No. 42, Oct.
20, 2005.
[16]
See e.g. NIGSC, p. 4-4, 7-3; G&M,
Business, p. 148; G&M, Crime, throughout; Aborn
Report, throughout; Dept. of Justice Report, p. 159-160;
Padavan Report, p. 55.
[17]
See e.g. Planning for the Future,
above.
[18]
See NIGSC, p. 7-13 to -16, -19 to
-25; Kindt testimony, p. 9, 12 and tables; G&M, Crime, p. 10;
G&M, Business Profitability, p. 149-155 and tables; Aborn,
Report, throughout.
[19]
See G&M, Crime, p. 14; Aborn
Report p 6-7.
[20]
See NIGSC, p.7-25 to-28; Kindt
testimony, p. 9, 12 and tables; G&M, Crime, p. 10, 24; G&M,
Business Profitability, p.149-155 and tables; Aborn,
Report, throughout; Jeff Benedict, “A Raw Deal”,
published by the Connecticut Alliance Against Casino Expansion, 2005;
Yankee magazine, p. 121; Foxwoods Testimony.
[21]
U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 3; Johnson v. McIntosh,
21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. 29, sec. 2701 et. seq.
[hereafter IGRA]
[22]
See Dalton v. Pataki; RESERVATION REPORT, A Monthly Media Letter
Regarding American Indian Policies, Published by New Century
Communications, available online at
http://www.Thecommunityforum.com/Reservation_Report.htm, e.g.
news from the months of September and October, 2005; also
Indianz.com-Your Gaming Resource, available online, again, sample
news from September and October, 2005 [hereafter indianz.com]; The
American Indian Policy Center [hereafter AIPC], “Contemporary
Threats to Tribal Sovereignty From the States,” available on line at
http://www.airpi.org/research/st98cont_states.html, and see
other articles available at the American Indian Policy Center site.
[23]
See Kindt Testimony, p. 6; AIPC, “American Indian Tribal Sovereignty
Primer,” available at
http://www.airpi.org/pubs/indinsov.html; Yankee magazine;
Benedict, Without Reservation p. 301; Andrea Barrist Stern,
“New Sheriff in Town”, above, quoting legal advice to the effect
that state labor laws do not apply in native American owned casinos.
[24]
See Kindt Testimony, p. 6; AIPC, “American Indian Tribal
Sovereignty Primer,” available at
http://www.airpi.org/pubs/indinsov.html; Yankee magazine, p.
121; Hallie Arnold, “State regs don’t apply to casino,” Kingston
Freeman, Sept. 16, 2005 [hereafter Hallie Arnold, State regs don’t
apply.]
[25]
See IGRA, 25 U.S.C. sec. 2710 (d)(3)-(8); See also Contracts and
Agreements with Indian Tribes, 25 U.S.C. Chap. 3, Subchapter II,
sec. 81(b) and sec. 85. And see, with regard to uncertainty
surrounding the application of IGRA, e.g. Padavan Report, p. 25;
Aborn Report, p. 29.
[26]
IGRA, 25 U.S.C. sec. 2701 et. Seq. See also Yankee magazine, p. 121.
[27]
See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. 465 (1934)
[hereafter IRA].
[28]
. See IGRA, 25 U.S.C. sec. 2703(4); Contracts and agreements with
Indian tribes, 25 U.S.C. Chap. 3, Subchapter II, sec. 81(a)(1);
Yankee magazine, p. 149.
[29]
Conversation with Dave Reed, former Verona town supervisor; Krista
J. Karch, “399,000,000”, Observer-Dispatch (Utica-gannett), April
28, 2005.
[30]
See e.g. “Appeals court upholds legality of land-into-trust
process”, available on line at
http://www.indianz.com/News/2005/010299.asp; “Budget Bill Orders
Study of Land-Into-Trust Process,”(109th Congress, May
27, 2005), and other articles cited in indianz.com
[31]
Yankee magazine, p. 148; see also Foxwoods Testimony.
[33]
See Report of Dr. Andrew J. Michalski, submitted in Statement of
Berle, Kass & Case on Behalf of the Town of Saugerties and the
Winston Farm Alliance Concerning the Draft Generic Environmental
Impact Statement on the Ulster County Solid Waste Management
Program, Sept. 15, 1989 [hereafter Michalski Report]; Ground Water
Protection Plan for the Town of Saugerties, Ulster County, New York,
Oct. 20, 2005, prepared by Steven Winkley, New York Rural Water
Association [hereafter CAC Report].
[34]
. Hallie Arnold, State regs don’t apply, indicating the Oneida
tribe’s Turning Stone Casino consumes more than 600,000 gallons a
day; the original developers’ estimate of a million .
[36]
See Hallie Arnold, State regs don’t apply; Yankee magazine p. 121;
Foxwoods Testimony.
[37]
The influence is manifest in the dependence of local officials, in
enormous campaign contributions to State and Federal officials, and
in bribe-taking and other forms of corruption. See e.g. NIGSC,
p. 7-18; Thomas A. Barrett, Sr., economist, Community Affairs, Fed.
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Casino Gambling in America and its
Economic Impacts. 2003, p. 25; John Warren Kindt, Follow the
Money: Gambling, Ethics, and Subpoenas, 556 Annals of the Am.
Academy of Political & Soc. Sci., 85-97 (1998); Benedict, Without
Rerservation, p.273, 325; G&M, Crime, p. 1; Kindt
Testimony, p. 5; Aborn report, p. 18-19; Joe Siccardi, Article
including information about undue political influence,
published in Revielle Between the Lakes,
Oct. 20, 2005; Andrea Barrist Stern, “The Secret of Success,”
Saugerties Times, Ulster Publishing Co., Inc., Vol. 10, No. 42, Oct.
20, 2005.
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